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We show that deviations from long-run stability of product prices are optimal in 
the presence of endogenous producer entry and product variety in a sticky-price 
model with monopolistic competition in which price stability would be optimal in 
the absence of entry. Specifically, a long-run positive (negative) rate of inflation is 
optimal  when  the  benefit  of  variety  to  consumers  falls  short  of  (exceeds)  the 
market incentives for creating that variety under flexible prices, governed by the 
desired markup. Plausible preference specifications and parameter values justify a 
long-run  inflation  rate  of  two  percent  or  higher.  Price  indexation  implies  even 
larger deviations from long-run price stability. However, price stability (around 
this non-zero trend) is close to optimal in the short run, even in the presence of 
time-varying flexible-price markups that distort the allocation of resources across 
time and states. The central bank uses its leverage over real activity in the long run, 
but  not  in  the short run. Our results  point to  the need  for continued  empirical 
research on the determinants of markups and investigation of the benefit of product 
variety to consumers.   
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A recent, fast growing literature argues that changes in the range of available product varieties
contribute signiﬁcantly to economic dynamics and movements in prices over time spans usually
associated with the length of business cycles (Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz, 2007, Broda and Wein-
stein, 2010, and references therein). In the light of this literature, the question of how to conduct
economic policy optimally in economies with endogenous producer entry and product variety arises
naturally. This paper investigates this question from the perspective of monetary policy and stud-
ies whether endogenous producer entry and product variety generate optimal deviations from price
stability in the long and the short run. We address this question in a dynamic, stochastic, general
equilibrium model with imperfect price adjustment and study Ramsey-optimal monetary policy
in a second-best environment in which lump-sum taxes are not available. Therefore, our paper
contributes to a large literature, reviewed below, that seeks to describe optimal monetary policy
in fully articulated, general-equilibrium models with nominal and real rigidities, using the tools of
modern public ﬁnance (e.g. Khan, King, and Wolman, 2003, and Adao, Correia, and Teles, 2003).1
Producer entry in our model takes place subject to sunk costs in the expectation of future
monopoly proﬁts. On the consumer side, entry is motivated by preferences that exhibit a taste
for variety; in particular, we assume that consumers have homothetic preferences over symmetric,
individual products. Price adjustment is costly, as producers incur a quadratic adjustment cost to
change their prices (Rotemberg, 1982). This generates a Phillips curve that relates the markup to
producer price inﬂation. The central bank may try to use inﬂation to inﬂuence markups, in the long
run and over the business cycle, with the goal of closing the ineﬃciency wedge between the marginal
rate of consumption-leisure substitution and the marginal product of labor. Furthermore, when the
beneﬁt of variety to consumers and the market incentive for product creation are not aligned, an
additional distortion occurs: If the beneﬁt of variety exceeds the markup, there is too little entry,
and vice versa (Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz, 2008a). The central bank may use inﬂation–in the
long run and/or over the business cycle–to align markups (which govern entry incentives) and
beneﬁt of variety. When preferences are such that the elasticity of substitution between varieties
depends on their number, time-variation in the desired, ﬂexible-price markup introduces a dynamic
dimension to the distortions in labor supply and product creation by generating a misallocation
1Lucas and Stokey (1983) started oﬀ the literature on Ramsey-optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy. Chari, Chris-
tiano, and Kehoe (1991) study optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy under ﬂexible prices and extend the model to
include capital. An incomplete list of recent contributions in a variety of scenarios includes Arseneau and Chugh
(2008), Chugh (2006), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a,b), and Siu (2004).
1of resources across time and states of nature (Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz, 2008a). The central
bank can thus in principle use inﬂation over the business cycle to smooth the path of the markup
over time. We study how these distortions and possible objectives for the central bank shape the
optimal conduct of monetary policy.
Our results are twofold, pertaining to long-run and short-run inﬂation. Signiﬁcant deviations
from long-run price stability can be optimal, and their sign and magnitude depend on the balance
of market incentives for entry and welfare beneﬁt of variety. When the market outcome results in
too much entry (the net markup is higher than the beneﬁt of variety), the central bank uses its
leverage over real activity by choosing a positive steady-state producer price inﬂation rate to erode
the markup and reduce suboptimal entry. Long-run deﬂation occurs when the market provides too
little entry, for it is deﬂation that increases markups and boosts entry in this case. Optimal long-
run inﬂation is zero if and only if preferences feature constant elasticity of substitution (C.E.S.)
in the form introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977–henceforth, C.E.S.-D.S.). This preference
speciﬁcation is characterized by a perfect balancing of incentive for product creation and beneﬁto f
variety. Importantly, optimal deviations from long-run price stability generated by departing from
this knife-edge scenario can be quantitatively signiﬁcant: Depending on the value of the parameter
that measures the beneﬁt of variety, the optimal inﬂation rate ranges from an annualized 4 percent
to an annualized −8 percent; these numbers are even larger under price indexation. Plausible
preferences and parameter values justify the 2 percent target adopted by central banks throughout
the industrialized world (see Table 1 in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2011, for a summary).
In the short run, however, we ﬁnd that price stability (around a possibly non-zero optimal
trend) is a robust policy prescription. We illustrate this result by plotting impulse responses of
real and nominal variables to productivity shocks under the optimal policy and under stable prices,
and showing that the diﬀerences between the two equilibria are insigniﬁcant. Under C.E.S.-D.S.
preferences, this implies that the central bank does not attempt to use inﬂation (over the business
cycle as in the long run) to close the constant gap between the marginal rate of consumption-leisure
substitution and the marginal product of labor that generates ineﬃciency. With more general C.E.S.
preferences that disentangle beneﬁt of variety and market power, this implies that the central bank
has no incentive to deviate from the optimal long-run inﬂation rate in an attempt to further close
the (constant) ineﬃciency wedge between beneﬁt of variety and market incentives for entry. Finally,
with non-C.E.S. (exponential or translog) preferences, we ﬁnd that the monetary authority makes
no use of inﬂation over time to correct for the misallocation of resources across time and states that
2occurs with a time-varying ﬂexible-price markup. This robust result of short-run price stability is
consistent with standard tax smoothing arguments made in the dynamic public ﬁnance literature
(see Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2006, for a review): The Ramsey planner tries to smooth ineﬃciency
wedges over time, but this results in our framework in a path for its instrument (inﬂation) that is
close to constant.2
We conclude our analysis by calculating the welfare costs (in units of steady-state consumption)
of perfectly stabilizing prices in the long and in the short run, and we ﬁnd that the cost of price
stability can indeed be sizable, the more so, the more the beneﬁt of variety deviates from the net
markup. A decomposition of this welfare loss in a static component (due to the misalignment
of beneﬁt of variety and entry incentive) and a dynamic one (due to a time-varying ﬂexible-price
markup) indicates that the latter is negligible. Therefore, our conclusion is that the introduction of
endogenous entry and more general preferences for variety than C.E.S.-D.S. can dramatically alter
the long-run policy prescriptions obtained under ﬁxed variety, but not the short-run implications.
Our results contribute to a large and growing literature on optimal monetary policy and inﬂation
by studying a hitherto unexplored motive for non-zero optimal inﬂation. To isolate the contribution
of the novel feature of our analysis (entry and variety), we abstract from other, well understood
features that have been shown to result in optimal deviations from price stability. In particular, the
presence of government spending has been shown to imply optimal deviations from price stability in
a variety of economic environments and under diﬀerent approaches to the optimal policy problem.
This conclusion arises in the Ramsey-optimal policy exercises of Khan, King, and Wolman (2003),
whose model features staggered pricing and monetary and real distortions, and Adão, Correia, and
Teles (2003), whose model features predetermined prices. The same conclusion emerges from the
linear-quadratic environment of Woodford (2003, Ch. 6.5), whose model features Calvo (1983)
pricing and a distorted steady state (see also Benigno and Woodford, 2005). The ﬁrst two papers
also discuss the role of monetary distortions in shaping policy tradeoﬀs; Ireland (1996) had shown
that the Friedman rule is optimal in a monetary model with preset prices, and this result extends
to a variety of economic environments. In the absence of government spending and money demand
distortions, however, price stability is optimal or at least close to optimal in these models: The
monetary authority does not use inﬂation (a distortionary tax) to try to close the constant wedge
2This result is consistent with the analysis of Ramsey-optimal ﬁscal policy in Chugh and Ghironi (2009), in a
ﬂexible-price model similar to ours. There, the Ramsey planner chooses a smooth path for the tax rate on dividends,
for the same reason. Indeed, inﬂation in our framework resembles an indirect tax on dividends (see Bilbiie, Ghironi,
and Melitz, 2008a).
3between the marginal rate of consumption-leisure substitution and the marginal product of labor
implied by monopolistic competition and endogenous labor supply.3 It is important to notice that
even when optimal deviations from short-run price stability occur in the existing literature (e.g.
in the presence of government spending or monetary distortions), the ﬁnding that price stability
is the optimal long-run policy prescription is surprisingly robust across a wide range of economic
environments.4 Indeed, this is a common theme of all the variations of the baseline model considered
by Woodford (2003): “The optimal long-run inﬂation target is zero in this model, no matter how
large the steady-state distortions may be” (p. 462, emphasis in original). Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2011) comprehensively review the existing literature on optimal inﬂation and conclude that “the
observed inﬂation objectives of central banks pose a puzzle for monetary theory”; optimal long-run
inﬂation is zero or very close to zero under a wide range of economic frictions, including incomplete
taxation, the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, downward rigidity in nominal wages,
a n dt h eq u a l i t yb i a si nm e a s u r e di n ﬂation5. Thus, endogenous entry and product variety yield a
policy implication that is largely new to the literature. Two recent contributions study reasons for
deviating from long-run price stability that are complementary to ours: Weber (2011) emphasizes
the role of a constant rate of growth in ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity and ﬁnds that the optimal rate
of long-run inﬂation is equal to the growth rate, and Wolman (2011) ﬁnds that slight deﬂation is
optimal in a two-sector model in which there is a trend in relative prices.
This paper is not the ﬁrst to study optimal monetary policy under endogenous entry. In two
recent contributions, Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2008b) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008) study
models with endogenous entry and imperfect price adjustment (sticky prices as in Rotemberg, 1982,
and one-period-ahead predetermined prices, respectively). Both papers conclude that stabilizing
producer price inﬂation at zero in all periods is Pareto optimal in ﬁrst-best environments in which
lump-sum taxes are available to ﬁnance the subsidies (or taxes) needed to correct real distortions.
Lewis (2010) studies optimal monetary policy in an economy with entry, a cash-in-advance con-
straint, and sticky wages. In her model, optimal inﬂa t i o ni su s e do v e rt h ec y c l et oi m p r o v eu p o n
3Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005) show that, when the steady state is distorted and the
distortion is large (there are no lump sum taxes available to ﬁnance the subsidies needed to restore optimality), even
a constant level of government spending will lead to optimal deviations from short-run price stability. A central bank
that aims at stabilizing output and inﬂa t i o na r o u n dt h e i re ﬃcient levels will face a tradeoﬀ induced by productivity
shocks that act like “cost-push” shocks in the Phillips curve when steady-state government spending is not zero.
4Thomas (2008) and Faia (2009) are two examples of models (incorporating search and matching frictions in the
labor market) in which long-run price stability is optimal and short-run price stability is not. Erceg, Henderson, and
Levin (2000) showed that deviations from short-run price stability are optimal when nominal wages are also sticky.
5Two popular theoretical justiﬁcations for deviations from long-run price stability are the zero lower bound (see e.g.
Billi, 2011) and downward nominal wage rigidity (Kim and Ruge-Murcia, 2009). Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe’s results
imply that these distortions are not enough to generate quantitatively signiﬁcant deviations from price stability.
4the ﬂexible-wage response to shocks. In independent work, Faia (2010) uses a framework similar to
ours (essentially, the Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz, 2008b model), but with C.E.S.-D.S. preferences
and oligopolistic competition, as well as government spending shocks. She ﬁnds that the Ramsey
long-run prescription is “zero inﬂation”; however, in the short run, signiﬁcant deviations from price
stability are required for optimality. While apparently in stark contrast with our short-run ﬁndings,
the diﬀerence can be explained by the absence of government spending from our framework since,
as noted above, government spending by itself implies optimal deviations from short-run price sta-
bility. In order to isolate the potential role of entry and variety in generating deviations from price
stability, our framework therefore abstracts from government spending altogether.6
When considering these studies in relation to the conduct of monetary policy in reality, one may
question whether central banks should have distortions in product variety in mind when determining
t h er a t eo fi n ﬂation they should target. There are two reasons for an aﬃrmative answer. First, to
the extent that variety is important for aggregate ﬂuctuations and long-run welfare, generating the
optimal amount of variety should be part of the equilibrium that policy should try to accomplish.
Second, even if one may argue that optimal variety is best implemented by regulation policy,
reality shows that regulators intervene in the economy only under exceptional circumstances to
aﬀect the behavior of the largest ﬁrms (for instance, Microsoft). “Blanket” instruments that aﬀect
all producers at all points in time (such as inﬂation) are thus better suited to induce the optimal
equilibrium for the aggregate economy. More generally, the exercise of this paper is one of ﬁnding
the optimal monetary policy, given a certain economic environment–very much like all studies of
optimal monetary policy on which this paper builds–rather than a more general public ﬁnance
exercise that would try to assess which is the best policy instrument to use in order to address a
certain distortion.7
Since the key determinant of optimal long-run inﬂation in our model is the balance of markups
and beneﬁt of variety, we conclude by observing that our results point to the need for contin-
ued research on the determinants of markups and serious empirical investigation of the nature of
preferences for variety.8
6Faia also shows that policy rules targeting markups or asset prices can improve (from a welfare standpoint) upon
strict inﬂation targeting.
7See Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2008) for an example of how, when both consumption and labor income taxes
are available, the optimal policy (and the optimal alloca t i o ni t s e l f )d on o te v e nd e p e n do nt h ed e g r e eo fn o m i n a l
rigidity.
8While research on markups has already been extensive (see, for instance, Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999, and,
more recently, Nekarda and Ramey, 2010), there is little empirical evidence on the beneﬁt of variety to consumers.
We use this limited evidence in discussing policy scenarios below.
5The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a sticky-price model with
endogenous entry and general homothetic preferences for variety, drawing on Bilbiie, Ghironi, and
Melitz (2007; 2008a,b). Section 3 discusses the distortions that occur when prices are ﬂexible.
Section 4 describes and solves the Ramsey-optimal policy problem. Section 5 derives the optimal
policy prescriptions and their quantitative implications for inﬂation and real variables, distinguish-
ing between the long run and the short run. Section 6 quantiﬁes the welfare costs of fully stabilizing
producer prices, rather than following optimal policy. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Household Preferences and the Intratemporal Consumption Choice
We consider a cashless economy as in Woodford (2003). The economy is populated by a unit
mass of atomistic, identical households. The representative household supplies  hours of work
in each period  in a competitive labor market for the nominal wage rate  and maximizes
expected intertemporal utility 
£P∞
= − ( )
¤
,w h e r e is consumption and  ∈ (01)
the subjective discount factor. The period utility function takes the form  ( )=l n−(),
where  ()  0  () ≥ 0 and  ≡  () () ≥ 0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity of
labor supply to wages (and the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply).
At time , the household consumes the basket of goods ,d e ﬁned over a continuum of goods
Ω. At any given time , only a subset of goods Ω ⊂ Ω is available. Let  () denote the nominal
price of a good  ∈ Ω. Our model can be solved for any parametrization of symmetric homothetic
preferences. For any such preferences, there exists a well deﬁned consumption index  and an
associated welfare-based price index . The demand for an individual variety,  (),i st h e n
obtained as () = (), where we use the conventional notation for quantities with a
continuum of goods as ﬂow values.9
Given the demand for an individual variety, (), the symmetric elasticity of demand − (where
 measures the elasticity of substitution) is in general a function of the number  of goods available






 for any symmetric variety 
9See the appendix of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007) for more details.
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Together, () and () completely characterize the eﬀects of preferences in our model; explicit
expressions can be obtained for these objects upon specifying functional forms for preferences, as
will become clear in the discussion below.
Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerent variety
 ∈ Ω.10 Production requires only one factor, labor. Aggregate labor productivity is indexed by
, which represents the eﬀectiveness of one unit of labor. Productivity is exogenous and follows
an (1) process in percent deviation from its steady-state level. Output supplied by ﬁrm  is
 ()= (),w h e r e () is the ﬁrm’s labor demand for productive purposes. The unit cost of
production, in units of the consumption good ,i s,w h e r e ≡  is the real wage.
Prior to entry, ﬁrms face a sunk entry cost of  eﬀective labor units, equal to  units of
the consumption good. There are no ﬁxed production costs. Hence, all ﬁrms that enter the economy
produce in every period, until they are hit with a “death” shock, which occurs with probability
 ∈ (01) in every period.
Firms face nominal rigidity in the form of a quadratic cost of adjusting prices over time (Rotem-
berg, 1982). Speciﬁcally, the real cost (in units of the composite basket) of output-price inﬂation











 () ≥ 0 (1)
This expression is interpreted as the amount of marketing materials that the ﬁrm must purchase
when implementing a price change. We assume that this basket has the same composition as the
10For convenience, we use the terms good and variety interchangeably. Note that the assumption that each ﬁrm
produces a diﬀerent variety implies that the number of goods available  is also the number of producers in period
. We refer to individual producers as ﬁrms following the standard convention in the New Keynesian literature.
However, a more general–and empirically relevant–interpretation is to think of productive units as product lines at
ﬁrms whose boundaries we leave unspeciﬁed. See Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007) for more details.
7consumption basket. The cost of adjusting prices is proportional to the real revenue from output
sales, ( ())
 (),w h e r e
 () is ﬁrm ’s output demand, to capture the idea that larger
ﬁrms must purchase more materials when implementing a price change.
Firms face demand for their output from consumers and ﬁrms themselves when they change
prices. In each period, there is a mass  of ﬁrms producing and setting prices in the economy.
When a new ﬁrm sets the price of its output for the ﬁrst time, we appeal to symmetry across ﬁrms
and interpret the  − 1 price in the expression of the price adjustment cost for that ﬁrm as the
notional price that the ﬁrm would have set at time  − 1 if it had been producing in that period.
An intuition for this simplifying assumption is that all ﬁrms (even those that are setting the price
for the ﬁrst time) must buy the bundle of goods  () when implementing a price decision.11
It should be noted, however, that this assumption is entirely consistent both with the original
Rotemberg (1982) setup and with our timing assumption below. Speciﬁcally, new entrants behave
as the (constant number of) price setters do in Rotemberg’s framework, where an initial condition
for the individual price is dictated by nature. In our framework, new entrants at any time  who
start producing and setting prices at  +1are subject to precisely the same assumption as price
setters in Rotemberg’s original setup. Moreover, the assumption that a new entrant, at the time
of its ﬁrst price setting decision, knows the average product price last period is consistent with the
timing assumption that an entrant starts producing only one period after entry, hence being able
to “learn” the average product price during the entry period.12
The total demand for the output of ﬁrm  
 () is thus used for both consumption and paying








where  ≡  (), and we used symmetry across ﬁrms in the deﬁnition of the aggregate
demand of the consumption basket for price adjustment purposes .
Since  () ≡  () is the real price of ﬁrm ’s output, ﬁrm ’s real proﬁti np e r i o d
(distributed to households as dividend) can be written as:
()= ()










11As shown by Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2008b), alternative speciﬁcations in which new producers take the ﬁrst
price setting decision without incurring a cost relative to a notional  − 1 decision result in very similar dynamics to
the benchmark setup for realistic rates of ﬁrm destruction .
12Symmetry of the equilibrium will imply −1 ()=−1∀.
8The real value of the ﬁrm at time  (in units of consumption) is the expected present discounted






where Λ ≡ [ (1 − )]
−  is the discount factor applied by households to future proﬁts from
ﬁrm  (which faces a probability  of being hit with the “death” shock in each period).
At time , ﬁrm  chooses  () and  () to maximize  ()+ () subject to  ()=
 (),
taking ,  , , ,a n d as given. Letting  () denote the Lagrange multiplier on the
constraint  ()=





The shadow value of an extra unit of output is simply the ﬁrm’s marginal cost, common across all
ﬁrms in the economy.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to  () yields:
 ()= () ()




































The markup reduces to ()[() − 1] in the absence of nominal rigidity ( =0 ).
Firm Entry and Exit
In every period, there is an unbounded mass of prospective entrants. These entrants are forward
looking, and correctly anticipate their future expected proﬁts  () in every period as well as the
probability  (in every period) of incurring the exit-inducing shock. We assume that entrants at
time  only start producing at time  +1 , which introduces a one-period time-to-build lag in the
9model. The exogenous exit shock occurs at the very end of the time period (after production and
entry). A proportion  of new entrants will therefore never produce. Prospective entrants in period
 compute their expected post-entry value given by the present discounted value of their expected
stream of proﬁts  (). This also represents the average value of incumbent ﬁrms after production
has occurred (since both new entrants and incumbents then face the same probability 1− of survival
and production in the subsequent period). Entry occurs until ﬁrm value is equalized with the entry
cost, leading to the free entry condition  ()=. This condition holds so long as the
mass  of entrants is positive. We assume that macroeconomic shocks are small enough for this
condition to hold in every period.13 Finally, the timing of entry and production we have assumed
implies that the number of producing ﬁrms during period  is given by  =( 1− )(−1 + −1).
Symmetric Firm Equilibrium
In equilibrium, all ﬁrms make identical choices. Hence,  ()=,  ()=,  ()=,
 ()=,  ()=,  ()=,  ()=,  ()=,a n d ()=. The aggregate
output of the consumption basket (used for consumption and to pay price adjustment costs) is
 
 ≡  +  =  = ,
where  = () captures a “variety eﬀect” that depends on the speciﬁcation of preferences across
varieties (see below).























This can be simpliﬁed further by noting that  = 2
 



























+1 (1 + +1)+1
io (3)
This equation is the non-linear Phillips curve relation in our model. Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz
13If  ()  , prospective entrants will not be willing to incur the sunk entry cost, resulting in zero entry.
10(2008b) show that its log-linear version (around a steady state with zero inﬂation) reduces to
a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve augmented for the eﬀect of changes in the number of
available product varieties.
Household Budget Constraint, Saving, and Labor Supply
Households hold two types of assets: shares in a mutual fund of ﬁrms and bonds. Let  be the
share in the mutual fund of ﬁrms held by the representative household entering period .T h e
mutual fund pays a total proﬁt in each period (in units of currency) that is equal to the total proﬁt
of all ﬁrms that produce in that period, .D u r i n gp e r i o d, the representative household buys
+1 shares in a mutual fund of  +  ﬁrms (those already operating at time  and the new
entrants). Only a 1 −  fraction of these ﬁrms will produce and pay dividends at time  +1 .S i n c e
the household does not know which ﬁrms will be hit by the exogenous exit shock  at the very end
of period ,i tﬁnances the continuing operation of all pre-existing ﬁrms and all new entrants during
period . The date  price of a claim to the future proﬁt stream of the mutual fund of  + 
ﬁrms is equal to the average nominal price of claims to future proﬁts of home ﬁrms,  ≡ .
The household enters period  with nominal bond holdings  and mutual fund share hold-
ings . It receives gross interest income on bond holdings, dividend income on mutual fund share
holdings and the value of selling its initial share position, and labor income. The household al-
locates these resources between purchases of bonds and shares to be carried into next period and
consumption. The period budget constraint (in units of currency) is:
+1 +  ( + )+1 +  =( 1+−1) +(  + ) + 
where −1 denotes the nominal interest rate on holdings of bonds between  − 1 and ,a n d
denotes nominal dividends ( ≡ ). Dividing both sides by  and denoting holdings of bonds
in units of consumption with +1 ≡ +1,w ec a nw r i t e
+1 +  ( + )+1 +  =( 1+) +(  + ) +  (4)
where 1+  is the gross, consumption-based, real interest rate on holdings of bonds between  −1





,w i t h
 ≡ −1 −1. The household maximizes
its expected intertemporal utility subject to this budget constraint.


















As expected, forward iteration of the equation for share holdings and absence of speculative bubbles
yield the asset price solution in equation (2).14
The ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal choice of labor eﬀort requires that the marginal disutil-






Aggregate Accounting and Equilibrium
Aggregating the budget constraint (4) across households and imposing the equilibrium conditions
+1 =  =0and +1 =  =1 , ∀, yields the aggregate accounting identity  ≡  +  =
 + , where we deﬁned GDP, : Consumption plus investment (in new ﬁrms) must be
equal to income (labor income plus dividend income).
Labor market equilibrium requires  +  = :T h et o t a la m o u n to fl a b o ru s e d
in production and to set up the new entrants’ plants must equal aggregate labor supply. (Of
course, this condition is redundant once equilibrium in goods and asset markets is imposed.) The
equilibrium conditions of our benchmark model are summarized in Table 1. The model is closed
by specifying monetary policy conduct–in Table 1, there are 12 equations and 13 endogenous
variables. Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2008b) analyze the case where monetary policy follows a
simple Taylor rule, as well as optimal monetary policy in a ﬁrst-best environment. Here, we study
optimal policy using the Ramsey approach, following a vast literature on optimal policy in second-
best environments. Before doing that, we outline the particular preference speciﬁcations that we
will use as examples and discuss a measurement issue that arises in this class of models. We then
review the sources of ineﬃciency (distortions) that are present even when all ﬁrms set their prices
freely.
14We omit the transversality conditions for bonds and shares that must be satisﬁed to ensure optimality.
12Table 1. Benchmark Model, Summary

































Free entry  = 


Number of ﬁrms  =( 1− )(−1 + −1)
Intratemporal optimality  ()=































Preference Speciﬁcations and Flexible-Price Markups
We consider four alternative preference speciﬁcations as special cases for illustrative purposes below.
Here, we discuss the implications of these preferences for the welfare beneﬁt of variety and the
desired, ﬂexible-price markups, obtained if all individual producers can adjust their prices freely in
the ﬂexible-price equilibrium, which we denote with a star.
The ﬁrst preference speciﬁcation features a constant elasticity of substitution between goods






 where 1 is the symmetric elasticity of substitution across





 and the house-
hold’s demand for each individual good  is  ()=(  ())
− . It follows that the ﬂexible-
price markup and the beneﬁt of variety are independent of the number of goods: ∗ () − 1=
∗ ()= =1 ( − 1). The second speciﬁcation is the C.E.S. variant with generalized love of
variety introduced by the working paper version of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and studied by Benassy
(1996), which disentangles monopoly power (measured by the net markup 1( − 1)) and consumer
13love for variety, captured by a constant parameter 0. With this speciﬁcation (labelled “gen-








The third preference speciﬁcation features exponential love-of-variety (we call it “exponential” for
short) and is in some sense just the opposite of the previous: the elasticity of substitution is not
constant (because of demand-side pricing complementarities), but the beneﬁt of variety is equal to
the net markup. Speciﬁcally, the elasticity of substitution is ∗ ()=1+ where 0 is a
free parameter, and the relative price is given by ∗ ()=
− 1
; hence, the beneﬁt of variety and
the markup are, respectively: ∗ ()=∗ ()−1=1  As  increases, goods become closer
substitutes, and the elasticity of substitution increases. If goods are closer substitutes, then the
markup ∗ () and the beneﬁt of additional varieties in elasticity form (∗ ()) must decrease;15
for this speciﬁc functional form, the markup and beneﬁto fv a r i e t yd e c r e a s eb yt h es a m ea m o u n t
when  increases. Finally, the fourth preference speciﬁcation uses the translog expenditure func-
tion proposed by Feenstra (2003). For this speciﬁcation, the symmetric price elasticity of demand
is 1+,w i t h0. In contrast to the previous speciﬁcation, the change in ∗ () is only
half the change in the net markup generated by an increase in the number of producers. Table 2
summarizes the expressions for markup, relative price, and beneﬁt of variety in elasticity form for
each preference speciﬁcation.
Table 2. Four Preference Speciﬁcations
C.E.S.-D.S. General C.E.S. Exponential Translog
∗ = 

















 ˜   ˜  ≡ (Ω)
∗ ()=∗ − 1 ∗ ()= ∗ ()= 1
 = ∗ () − 1 ∗ ()= 1
2 = 1
2 (∗ () − 1)
A Measurement Issue: Consumer versus Producer Price Inﬂation
As argued at length in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007 and 2008b), a measurement issue applies
to any model with product variety: Empirically relevant variables–as opposed to welfare-consistent
concepts–net out the eﬀect of changes in the range of available products. The reason is that con-
struction of consumer price index (CPI) data by statistical agencies does not adjust for availability
of new products as in the welfare-consistent price index. Furthermore, adjustment for variety, when
15This property for the markup occurs whenever the price elasticity of residual demand decreases with quantity
consumed along the residual demand curve.
14it happens, certainly neither happens at the frequency represented by periods in our model, nor
using one of the speciﬁc functional forms for preferences that our model assumes. Mismeasurement
of the CPI, and more speciﬁcally, the bias induced by not accounting for new goods, has been the
subject of much research starting with the Boskin Commission Report (Boskin et al, 1996). In
particular, the commission found that the CPI was subject to an upward measurement bias of 1.2
percent on average (estimates ranging from 0.8 to 1.6 percent), half of which was due to not ac-
counting for the introduction of new (or better-quality) goods; Gordon (2000, 2006) discusses why
these estimates are indeed very conservative, and why the bias from not accounting for new goods
may be larger. More recently, Broda and Weinstein (2010) also document the sizable upward bias
induced in measured CPI by not accounting for new varieties: The CPI is on average 0.8 percentage
p o i n t sp e ry e a rh i g h e rt h a nac o s t - o f - l i v i n gi ndex that takes product turnover into account.
An implication of this measurement issue for our model is that the “true” welfare-based CPI of
our model is not observable in the data or, conversely, that the observed, measured CPI is closer
to the producer price index (PPI) of our model (the average price of a product)  than .16 Since
the PPI is the price index in the model available to a central bank trying to measure inﬂation, all
of our normative discussion below will be cast in terms of this observable variable: Consequently,
we will use “inﬂation” to refer to “PPI inﬂation” below.
3 Sources of Ineﬃciency in the Flexible-Price Equilibrium
Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2008b) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008) show that optimal monetary
policy always seeks to stabilize producer prices perfectly in a ﬁrst-best environment (where lump-
sum taxes/transfers are available to ﬁnance any optimal subsidies/taxes used to correct distortions
that arise under ﬂexible prices). The question that we address in this paper is: Would a Ramsey
planner that operates in a second-best environment (where such lump-sum taxes are not available)
choose non-zero inﬂation in the long run (in steady state) and over the business cycle?
Before we delve into this question, it is useful to review the sources of distortions that can make
the ﬂexible-price equilibrium (obtained when  =0 )i n e ﬃcient in our model; A detailed discussion of
the ineﬃciencies associated with monopolistic competition and entry in this framework is provided
by Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2008a).
16For this reason, when investigating the properties of their model in relation to the data, Bilbiie, Ghironi, and
Melitz (2007 and 2008b) focus on real variables deﬂated by a data-consistent price index: For any variable  in units
of the consumption basket, its data-consistent counterpart is obtained as  ≡  =  = ().
15The ﬂexible-price model features two margins of adjustment: a static, intratemporal margin
(captured by the optimality condition for labor eﬀort) and a dynamic, intertemporal margin (cap-
tured by the Euler equation for the number of products). Associated with each of these margins
is an ineﬃciency wedge relative to the corresponding optimality condition for the social planning
problem. There are three distortions that impact these two margins and the associated wedges:
Distortion 1. The ﬁrst distortion aﬀects the intratemporal labor optimality condition: With elastic labor
supply, and consumption goods priced at a markup over marginal cost, the household “buys”
an ineﬃciently high amount of the cheaper good (leisure, which is not priced at a markup),
and so it ends up working and consuming too little. This is true in models with endogenous
variety as in models with ﬁxed variety. The ineﬃciency wedge in labor optimality can be
constant (as under C.E.S. preferences) or time-varying (as under exponential or translog
preferences). We refer to this distortion as the “labor distortion.”
Distortion 2. The second distortion operates through the intertemporal product creation margin: When
the welfare beneﬁto fv a r i e t y∗ () and the net markup ∗ () − 1 (which measures the
proﬁt incentive for ﬁrms to enter the market) are not aligned, entry is ineﬃcient from a
social standpoint. When, for instance, the beneﬁt of variety is low compared to the desired
markup (∗ ()  ∗ () − 1), the consumer surplus of creating a new variety is lower
than the proﬁt signal received by a potential entrant; the resulting entry is therefore too
high, and the size of the distortion is governed by the diﬀerence between the desired net
markup and the beneﬁt of variety. The opposite holds–the level of entry is ineﬃciently
low–when ∗ ()  ∗ () − 1. We refer to this distortion as the “static entry distortion"
below, where “entry” refers to the fact that the distortion aﬀects an intertemporal margin and
“static” highlights the fact that this distortion–a within-the-period misalignment of beneﬁt
of variety and markup–still operates if we are in a static model and/or in steady state, and
for C.E.S. preferences for which Distortion 3 below disappears.
Distortion 3. The third distortion also operates through the intertemporal product creation margin, com-
bining with Distortion 2 to determine the ineﬃciency wedge in this margin relative to the
social (Pareto) optimum: Variations in desired markups over time (induced by changes in the
elasticity of substitution as the product space changes) introduce an additional discrepancy–
equal to equal to the ratio ∗ ()∗ (+1)–between the “private” (competitive equilib-
rium) and “social” (Pareto optimum) return to a new variety. When there is entry, the future
16markup is lower than the current one, and this ratio increases, generating an additional ineﬃ-
cient reallocation of resources to entry in the current period. We refer to this distortion as the
“dynamic entry distortion” below, where “entry” again captures its relevance to the model’s
intertemporal margin and associated wedge, and “dynamic” refers to the fact that this dis-
tortion operates only with preferences that allow for time-varying markups and, therefore,
misalignment of markups across time and states.
Note that distortions 2 and 3 disappear when preferences are of the C.E.S.-DS form. In this
case, the market economy achieves eﬃciency along the product creation margin.
The remarkable feature of all three distortions listed above is that they depend on the markup.
With sticky prices, a Phillips curve relates markups with current and expected inﬂation; the central
bank can therefore attempt to correct these distortions by using the level and intertemporal path
of inﬂation to aﬀe c tt h el e v e la n di n t e r t e m p o r a lp a t ho fm a r kups. In the plain vanilla sticky price
model with C.E.S.-DS preferences and labor as the only factor of production, optimal policy refrains
from using inﬂation to aﬀect the average level of the markup and pursues price stability over the
cycle to smooth the dynamics of the labor wedge (keeping it constant) by keeping the markup
constant.
In this paper, we study the interaction of the ﬂexible-price distortions above with the distortion
implied by sticky prices in shaping Ramsey-optimal monetary policy in a second-best environment17.
The question we started this section with can thus be re-stated as follows: Will a Ramsey planner
use non-zero inﬂation (and so trade oﬀ some of the costs associated with it) in order to close the
ineﬃciency wedges reviewed above, i.e., minimize the gap between marginal rate of substitution
and transformation between consumption and labor, bring the proﬁt incentives for ﬁrm entry and
product creation closer to the beneﬁt of variety to consumers, and/or smooth the intertemporal
path of the markup?
4 Ramsey-Optimal Monetary Policy and Endogenous Entry and Product
Variety
Before discussing the solution to our policy problem, it is useful to recall the benchmark results
from the plain vanilla New Keynesian model with ﬁxed variety (see for instance Woodford, 2003;
Benigno and Woodford, 2005; and Woodford, 2011). In the most basic version of that framework,
17Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2008a) study ﬁrst-best ﬁscal policy that can decentralize the Pareto optimum, while
Chugh and Ghironi (2009) study Ramsey-optimal ﬁscal policy in a second-best environment.
17ineﬃciency is due to the sticky-price distortion and the labor distortion (elastic labor and monop-
olistic competition). But–in the simplest version of the model in which no “cost-push” shocks
are present–the welfare costs of inﬂation outweigh the potential beneﬁts obtained by (even slight)
variations in inﬂation that would lead to markup erosion and improve the labor wedge; hence,
inﬂation is optimally not used. This is a standard-second best argument that holds regardless of
the value of labor supply elasticity. While the result holds exactly in the simplest model, it has
been shown (as reviewed in the Introduction) to be robust to the introduction of other frictions.
In the model with endogenous entry and product variety summarized in Table 1, we assume that
the central bank chooses the optimal paths of all 13 endogenous variables that maximize the present
discounted value of household utility, taking as constraints the 12 private agents’ decision rules.
Adding one Lagrange multiplier on each constraint, one obtains a system of 25 equations (12 private
agents’ decision rules and 13 ﬁrst-order conditions) and 25 unknowns (13 original variables and 12
Lagrange multipliers). The resulting system can be solved numerically by standard perturbation
methods.
In order to build intuition for the results that we will obtain numerically, we seek to obtain
analytical results whenever possible. To that end, note that the problem can be greatly simpliﬁed
as follows. First, since the nominal interest rate only enters the Euler equation for bonds, the
problem can be regarded as one where the central bank (the Ramsey planner) chooses the allocation
directly, and once the paths of consumption and CPI inﬂation are known, the path of the interest
rate consistent with optimality is uniquely determined by the Euler equation. Similar reasoning
and repeated substitutions of all the static equilibrium conditions into the three dynamic ones (the
Phillips curve, the law of motion for variety, and the Euler equation for shares) allow us to reduce
the model to the three-equation system in Table 3, where  denotes the total amount of labor
used in production of existing goods  ≡ .18
Table 3. Reduced Model, Summary































Therefore, the Ramsey planner chooses total labor, producer price inﬂation, labor allocated to








() which is implied by aggregate accounting.
18the consumption sector, and the number of ﬁrms to maximize the following Lagrangian (where 













































 () −  (1 + )+

























We present the ﬁrst-order conditions of this problem in Appendix A, where we also prove the
following result analytically.
Proposition 1 In a model with endogenous entry, homothetic preferences for variety, elastic labor,
and quadratic price adjustment costs, optimal inﬂation in the Ramsey equilibrium is zero in steady






Proof. See Appendix A.
It is worth emphasizing that zero long-run inﬂation is optimal (as long as the condition (6) holds)
regardless of labor supply elasticity. In other words, the planner does not use her distortionary
instrument (inﬂation) to correct the labor supply distortion in a standard second best fashion.
The introduction of ﬁrm entry and endogenous product variety in an environment with C.E.S.-
D.S. preferences does not change the conclusions obtained in the simplest, ﬁxed-variety model.
Intuitively, since the product creation margin is eﬃcient by virtue of the balancing of the beneﬁto f
variety with the monopoly proﬁt incentive for entry, and the planner was already not using inﬂation
in the ﬁxed-variety case, endogenous entry does not give the planner any additional incentive to
resort to this distortionary instrument.
When the condition (6) does not hold, i.e. when entry is distorted by the misalignment of
markup and beneﬁt of variety (the static entry distortion operates), a non-zero optimal long-run
rate of inﬂation may emerge: Long-run inﬂation aﬀects the steady-state markup and can be used
by the central bank to close the gap between the proﬁt incentive for ﬁrm entry (the steady-state
19markup) and the beneﬁto fv a r i e t yf o rc o n s u m e r s( ). In doing so, the central bank must weigh
the beneﬁts of this policy against the welfare costs of inﬂation. To understand this trade-oﬀ,n o t e
that our model’s long-run Phillips curve (LRPC), i.e. the relationship between steady-state net
markup and steady-state inﬂation (under the assumption ()=), is given by:







1+ (1 + )
− 1 (7)
This schedule is represented by the curve labelled LRPC in Figure 1, plotted against three values
of the beneﬁto fv a r i e t y represented by the vertical dash-dotted lines: lower than, equal to and
higher than the desired, ﬂexible-price steady-state markup, respectively. The value  corresponds
to the level of inﬂation that attains the lowest possible value of the markup ().19 The knife-edge
case for which Proposition 1 holds ( =1 ( − 1)) is obtained when the vertical line representing
the beneﬁt of variety intersects the markup curve at zero inﬂation. More generally, the problem of
the monetary authority is to pick a long-run inﬂation rate corresponding to a point on the LRPC
schedule that minimizes the gap between the steady-state markup () − 1 and the beneﬁto f
variety  taking into account the welfare costs of generating inﬂation.
19Analytically, =(  + )[( − 1)(1 + ) − 2( + )] which is positive for empirically plausible parameter values.
Note that the curve in (7) has another, upper branch (not plotted) for positive inﬂation rates only; we ignore that
branch because, with quadratic costs of inﬂation, inﬂation rates higher than  will never be chosen by an optimizing
central bank.
20Figure 1: The Long-run Phillips curve.
When the beneﬁt of variety is always lower than the net markup (1( − 1)), there is
always t o om u c he n t r yin the monopolistically competitive equilibrium. The central bank cannot
close this gap perfectly, but it can use inﬂation to minimize it by choosing the value of inﬂation that
minimizes the steady-state markup and hence reduces entry.U s i n gi n ﬂation entails welfare costs,
though, so the optimal value of inﬂation will balance these costs with the beneﬁt obtained from
moving closer to the lower markup level (measured roughly by the distance between the LRPC
and the leftmost vertical line in the ﬁgure, 1( − 1)). When the beneﬁt of variety is higher
than the lowest attainable level of the markup (the case represented by the rightmost vertical line,
1( − 1)), there is too little entry in the steady state with zero inﬂation. The central bank
will generate long-run deﬂation in order to increase long-run markups and stimulate entry and
variety towards their optimal level, trading this oﬀ against the welfare costs of non-zero inﬂation
- so equilibrium long-run deﬂation will actually never be as high as implied by the intersection of
LRPC with the vertical line plotting the beneﬁto fv a r i e t y .
The optimality of deviations from long-run pric es t a b i l i t yi no u rf r a m e w o r kr e l i e su p o nt h e
21existence of a non-vertical long-run Phillips curve. While the latter feature is also present in
any model of imperfect price adjustment (with no entry) that does not necessarily imply optimal
non-zero long-run inﬂation, it has diﬀerent welfare consequences in our framework because of the
intimate link between entry, variety, and the markup. In Appendix B, we show that our results are
actually strengthened under an alternative assumption that weakens the long-run tradeoﬀ between
inﬂation and real activity, namely price indexation.
Proposition 1 pertains to the optimal rate of inﬂation in the long run (i.e., in steady state).
Over the business cycle, the central bank may have an incentive to use inﬂation deviations from the
Ramsey-optimal long-run value under general C.E.S. preferences, since that value does not fully
eliminate the ineﬃciency coming from the failure of (6). The central bank may try to generate
inﬂation that is on average diﬀerent from the long-run value in order to try to bring markups even
closerto the beneﬁt of variety over the cycle. Furthermore, with non-C.E.S. preferences, another
distortion may emerge in the ﬂexible-price equilibrium: intertemporal misalignment of markups.
This occurs whenever desired, ﬂexible-price markups vary over time. The ﬂexible-price response
to shocks is ineﬃcient, and so optimal inﬂation varies over the business cycle, if the central bank
uses it to smooth markup dynamics and undo the implied intertemporal distortion. Note that the
distortions implied by misalignment of markup and beneﬁt of variety and time-varying ﬂexible-
price markup coexist under translog preferences: Condition (6) fails, and the desired ﬂexible-price
markup varies endogenously over time. We explore below whether this dynamic distortion induces
quantitatively signiﬁcant deviations from price stability.
5O p t i m a l I n ﬂation in the Long and in the Short Run: Quantitative Results
This section quantiﬁes the optimal long-run rate of inﬂation by means of a numerical example.
Moreover, we study the optimal path of inﬂation and other endogenous variables over the cycle in
response to productivity shocks. In the simulations below, we employ the parameter values used
in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007, 2008b). They are set as in Table 4 (and we normalize the
steady-state entry cost  and the steady-state level of productivity  to 1).
Table 4. Parameters
Parameter  
Value 099 0025 025 77
22The choice of the preference parameters, which are speciﬁc to the functional form of preferences
adopted ( and  for C.E.S.,  for exponential, and  for translog), is discussed in detail in the
respective section below. We consider diﬀerent values for the parameter governing the beneﬁto f
variety under general C.E.S. preferences, , since its value turns out to be crucial for our results.
Finally, we will perform robustness checks for diﬀerent values of the preference parameters, the
price stickiness parameter, , and the inverse labor supply elasticity, .
Optimal Long-Run Inﬂation
Figure 2 plots the optimal value of the steady-state inﬂation rate under general C.E.S. as a function
of the beneﬁt of variety parameter  for an interval going from  =0 , which implies that there is
no independent beneﬁt to the consumer of introducing a new variety to  =1 , which is higher than
any plausible empirical estimate of long-run average net markups. The elasticity of substitution
b e t w e e ng o o d si ss e tt o =3 8 a value that is consistent with product-level data (see the discussion
















Figure 2: Optimal long-run inﬂation rate as a function of beneﬁto fv a r i e t y ,b e n c h m a r k
calibration.
Unless the beneﬁt of variety and monopoly power coincide (C.E.S.-D.S. preferences) and the steady
state is eﬃcient, the optimal rate of PPI inﬂation in the Ramsey steady state is non-zero. Speciﬁ-
cally, with general C.E.S. preferences, the optimal steady-state inﬂation rate is positive (negative)
23when the beneﬁt of variety is smaller (larger) than the markup. Intuitively, when the number of
ﬁrms is suboptimally larger (smaller) than in the Pareto optimal equilibrium, the Ramsey-optimal
steady-state inﬂation rate becomes positive (negative) to reduce (increase) the markup, so that less
(more) ﬁrms are attracted to enter the market by less (more) proﬁt opportunities. The central
bank chooses a non-zero optimal level of steady-state inﬂa t i o nb yt r a d i n go ﬀ the welfare costs of
inﬂation and the beneﬁt of reducing the misalignment of beneﬁt of variety and proﬁt incentive for
entry.
As Figure 2 makes clear, the larger the diﬀerence between beneﬁt of variety and net markup,
the larger the deviation from long-run price stability. Indeed, sizable deviations from price stability
occur, ranging from an annual inﬂation rate of almost 4 percent, when the beneﬁt of variety is nil,
to an annual deﬂation rate of 6 percent, when the beneﬁto fv a r i e t yi s1. Higher (lower) values of the
elasticity of substitution  imply a lower (higher) markup and hence a lower (higher) threshold level
of the beneﬁto fv a r i e t y =1 ( −1) at which zero inﬂation becomes optimal. For example,  =6
generates a maximum value of long-run optimal inﬂation of 2 percent (when  =0 )a n dad e ﬂation
rate of 7 percent when  =1  Diﬀerent values of the price stickiness parameter  or the inverse
labor supply elasticity  do not change the optimal long-run inﬂation rate signiﬁcantly (results are
available upon request). In Appendix B, we study how our results change under price indexation.
We show that a higher degree of price indexation implies even larger optimal deviations from long-
run price stability. When indexation is almost full and the long-run Phillips curve is almost vertical,
the rate of optimal long-run inﬂation (or deﬂation) is very large indeed. For values of the indexation
parameter in line with empirical estimates (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007), the maximum value
of long-run optimal inﬂation ranges from around 6 percent (when  =0 )t oad e ﬂation rate of 10
percent (when  =1 )
The quantitative signiﬁcance of our results on the optimal deviation from long-run price stability
hinges upon one’s view of a plausible value for the parameter governing the welfare beneﬁto f
variety. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, decisive evidence on this parameter is hitherto
unavailable. Some estimates exist for the consumer surplus from introducing a new brand of a
speciﬁc product: See e.g. Trajtenberg (1989) for computed tomography (CT) scanners, Hausman
(1997, 1999) for Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios and mobile phones, Petrin (2002) for minivans, and
Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) for direct broadcast satellites and cable TV.
In our framework, one can ﬁnd a benchmark, model-implied value of  by using the following
calibration strategy. Speciﬁcally, our model implies the following relationship between PPI inﬂation,











where the second equality follows from the fact that, in general, the beneﬁt of variety (relative
price) is a function of the number of varieties available. Taking logs under the general C.E.S.
preference speciﬁcation, ()=( )
 (of which C.E.S.-D.S. is a special case), and allowing for





w h e r ew eu s e d ' ln(1 + ) and  is the average net growth rate in the number of varieties.
For reasons discussed above (Boskin et al, 1996, Broda and Weinstein, 2010), the CPI is subject
to an upward bias, a large part of which comes precisely from not accounting for new varieties:
ˆ  =  +  where ˆ  is data, measured CPI inﬂation Therefore, we need to account for this
bias when constructing our calibrated  by using measured CPI inﬂation ˆ . The magnitude of
the bias (the portion due to not accounting for new goods) is 06 percentage points per year in the
Boskin report and 08 percentage points in Broda and Weinstein (2010). The diﬀerential in the data
between (post-1982) average annual PPI and CPI inﬂation rates −ˆ  is at least −05 percentage
points (and at most −08) across a wide range of indexes. Finally, the average growth rate of
varieties since 1980 calculated by Bils and Klenow (2001) is around 2 percent. This calculation
therefore suggests that the beneﬁt of variety parameter  lies between 005 and 015, and it is in
any case not very far from zero–implying that the optimal long-run rate of inﬂation is positive.
However, a direct aggregate measure of the welfare beneﬁt of new products is not available, and
some argue that it is “probably not feasible” (Bils and Klenow, 2001). Therefore, our exercise should
be viewed as on the one hand providing a novel argument for potentially signiﬁcant deviations from
long-run price stability, and on the other pointing to the need for more empirical investigation into
the nature of preferences for variety, since this–along with markups–is the single most important
determinant of optimal deviations from price stability in a framework with endogenous product
variety.
This new role of the steady-state inﬂation rate is absent in the standard New Keynesian model
with ﬁxed variety. It is akin to the role of a positive capital income tax in a variety of scenarios, once
we note that inﬂa t i o ni nt h i sm o d e lh a st h es a m eﬂavor as a tax on proﬁts and thus an indirect tax
25on dividend income (see Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz, 2008b). Most speciﬁcally, Bilbiie, Ghironi,
and Melitz (2008a) have shown, in a version of our model with ﬂexible prices, that a (Pigouvian) tax
on dividend income ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes can entirely eliminate the steady-state distortion
coming from the mismatch of market incentives and consumer surplus of a new variety. Chugh and
Ghironi (2009) show that this ﬁnding extends to a (Ramsey) setting in which lump-sum taxes are
unavailable.20
Optimal Inﬂation over the Business Cycle
What is the optimal path of inﬂation over the business cycle in response to productivity shocks?
To answer this question, we log-linearize the three constraints in Table 3 and the four ﬁrst-order
conditions in Appendix A around the steady state with optimal long-run inﬂation, and we study
the responses to shocks under C.E.S., exponential, and translog preferences. All responses are
expressed in percentage deviations from steady state of the respective variable, with the important
exception of inﬂation and nominal interest rates, which are expressed in basis point deviations from
steady state.
C.E.S. Preferences
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of key endogenous variables (number of ﬁrms, inﬂation rate,
consumption, hours, nominal and real interest rates, price level, and inﬂation) to a one-percent pos-
itive productivity shock with autoregressive persistence 095 under C.E.S.-D.S. preferences. These
dynamics are compared to the benchmark responses under ﬂexible prices, which are essentially the
same as in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007).
20In models with physical capital, incomplete asset markets are a standard justiﬁcation for the optimality of a
positive long-run tax on capital income. As shown by Aiyagari (1995), agents over-save in a Bewley (1977) economy
with uninsured idiosyncratic shocks, for self-insurance reasons. A positive capital income tax rate can be welfare-
enhancing by reducing a suboptimally high capital level. Insofar as they pertain to the inability of the market
economy to internalize an externality and align incentives and beneﬁts between groups of agents in the economy, our
results are also related to those in Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and Choudhary and Levine (2006), who study tax
policies designed to internalize the externalities from external habits.
26Figure 3: Impulse responses to a productivity shock for C.E.S.-D.S. preferences under Ramsey
policy (red, crossed line) and ﬂexible prices (blue line). Inﬂation and interest rate are in basis
points deviations, the rest in percentage deviations from steady state.
As Figure 3 shows, optimal policy under C.E.S.-D.S. preferences consists of replicating the
ﬂexible-price solution. Although ﬂuctuations in the ﬂexible-price equilibrium are not optimal (be-
cause of the presence of a steady-state distortion generated by monopolistic competition in the
goods market combined with elastic labor supply), the central bank does not try to smooth these
ﬂuctuations using inﬂation. Optimal policy consists therefore of keeping the producer price level
constant. Nominal interest rates move (in line with the underlying determinants of the real interest
rate) in order to bring about this outcome. In this sense, policy needs to be activist as in Khan,
King, and Wolman (2003). This conclusion echoes the result obtained in ﬁxed-variety models when
there are no money demand distortions (see e.g. Khan, King, and Wolman, 2003) and is robust
27to changes in labor supply elasticity and the elasticity of substitution between goods (result are
available upon request). To sum up, under C.E.S.-D.S. preferences, our conclusion is that the
literature’s ﬁnding that price stability is optimal both in the long run and over the (productivity
shocks-driven) business cycle is robust to the introduction of endogenous entry and variety.
Next, we ask whether this conclusion changes when the beneﬁt of variety and the net markup
no longer coincide. Figures 4 and 5 plot the impulse responses for the same set of variables under
general C.E.S. preferences for  =0 1 and  =1 , respectively, and compare them with the ﬂexible-
price responses.
Figure 4: Impulse responses to a productivity shock for general C.E.S. preferences with  =0 1
under Ramsey policy (red, crossed line) and ﬂexible prices (blue line). Inﬂation and interest rate
are in basis points deviations, the rest in percentage deviations from steady state.
28Figure 5: Impulse responses to a productivity shock for general C.E.S. preferences with  =1
under Ramsey policy (red, crossed line) and ﬂexible prices (blue line). Inﬂation and interest rate
are in basis points deviations, the rest in percentage deviations from steady state.
In both cases, there are optimal deviations of inﬂation rate over the cycle (relative to its long-
run, steady-state value), which translate into diﬀerences in real variables. The reason is that the
optimal long-run policy does not entirely eliminate the steady-state distortion from the misalign-
ment between the consumer beneﬁt of a new variety and the ﬁrms’ incentives to introduce that
variety. When the beneﬁt of variety is lower (higher) than the steady-state markup, the central
bank engineers an inﬂationary (deﬂationary) path, relative to the long-run trend, in order to try to
bring average markups (by reducing and increasing them, respectively) even closer to the beneﬁt
of variety. The result is less (more) entry–and hence a lower (higher) number of ﬁrms–under the
29optimal policy than in the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. The paths of consumption and hours are also
diﬀerent from the ﬂexible-price solutions, although not signiﬁcantly so. Quantitatively, however,
the movements in inﬂation are minuscule: The maximum inﬂation rate in the ﬁrst scenario ( =0 1)
is a mere 005 basis points deviation from steady state, whereas in the second scenario ( =1 ),
the maximum deﬂation rate is a 01 basis points deviation from steady state; these translate into
small deviations of the price level (maximum values of 04 percent and −1 percent, respectively).
Therefore, we conclude that the monetary authority does not make use of the leverage it has to
inﬂuence real activity in the short run, despite facing a distorted steady state21; Quantitatively,
the welfare beneﬁts of further closing the ineﬃciency wedge are outweighed by the welfare costs
of inﬂation. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) that
Ramsey-optimal responses to productivity shocks are close to the ﬂexible-price ones in the presence
of a diﬀerent type of distortions (monetary ineﬃciency and time costs); a similar result occurs in
Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005), when steady-state government spending is
zero. More generally, the result that optimal inﬂation does not vary signiﬁcantly over the busi-
ness cycle is consistent with a standard tax smoothing motive (see Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2006,
for a review): The policymaker tries to smooth distortions over time, and this is achieved in our
framework by minimizing inﬂation variability.22
Exponential Preferences
The role of optimal policy in alleviating the dynamic entry distortion (Distortion 3) is best illus-
trated by using exponential preferences. Recall that for this class of preferences, desired markups
vary with the number of producers (because the elasticity of substitution between goods changes),
but the beneﬁt of a new variety and the net desired markup are equal (the static entry distortion
does not operate). Therefore, the conditions of Proposition 1 are met and zero long-run inﬂation
is optimal. To understand the inﬂation dynamics implied by these preferences, we abstract for the
moment from the welfare cost of inﬂation and note that loglinearizing the New Keynesian Phillips
21Appendix B shows that the short-run conclusions are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by price indexation.
22Inﬂation in our model resembles an indirect tax on dividends (see Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz, 2008b); In a model
s i m i l a rt oo u r sb u tw i t hﬂexible prices and focusing on ﬁscal policy, Chugh and Ghironi (2009) show that smoothing
ineﬃciency wedges can be achieved by smoothing dividend income taxes over the cycle.
30curve (3) around the (optimal, under these preferences) zero-inﬂation steady-state we obtain:













is the desired, ﬂexible-price markup (we have used 0 ()=) Note that variations in desired
markups are akin to the “cost-push shocks” used in the New Keynesian literature to justify short-
run deviations from price stability (see e.g. Woodford, 2003); diﬀerent from those shocks, however,
variations in desired markups are entirely endogenous here.
A central bank who wanted to entirely undo the dynamic entry distortion would set inﬂation
to aim for a constant path of realized markups,  =0 ; if this policy were feasible, it would imply
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Intuitively, the central bank needs to neutralize movements in the “natural”, ﬂexible-price
markup generated by entry. Since a positive productivity shock generates an increase in entry and
the number of producers and hence a fall in desired markups (by (9)), the central bank will typically
need to engineer a deﬂationary path, in order to keep realized markups constant. However, using
inﬂation entails resource costs, which need to be weighed against these beneﬁts–and so inﬂation
variations under optimal policy will typically be smaller than those implied by (10).
31Figure 6: Impulse responses to a productivity shock for exponential preferences with  =0 1
under Ramsey policy (red, crossed line) and ﬂexible prices (blue line). Inﬂation and interest rate
are in basis points deviations, the rest in percentage deviations from steady state.
Figure 6 plots the responses of the set of macroeconomic variables of interest for our baseline
set of parameter values. We use a low value of  =0 1 which implies a high elasticity of the desired
markup to the number of ﬁrms (see (9)) and hence relatively high variation of optimal inﬂation,
to give the model the best chance to generate deviations from short-run price stability. However,
Figure 6 shows that even under this extreme parameterization, deviations from price stability are
minimal: the maximum deﬂation rate (achieved after ﬁve quarters) is a mere 001 basis points,
translating into a maximum fall in the price level of around 01 percent after 20 quarters. We
conclude that the dynamic entry distortion from time-varying desired markups in itself does not
justify deviations from price stability, even when using a calibration that implies a very large
distortion.
32Translog Preferences
Long-run zero inﬂation is never optimal under translog preferences, because the beneﬁto fv a r i e t y
is always half the size of the steady-state desired markup. Therefore, optimal policy will always
use a positive inﬂation rate, seeking to align net markup and beneﬁt of variety (recall Figure 2
and the corresponding discussion). For instance, under the baseline calibration used by Bilbiie,
Ghironi, and Melitz (2008b), ( =0 353, which implies that the elasticity of substitution between
goods, 1+translog is the same as that used under C.E.S., i.e., 38), the beneﬁt of variety is
0178 and the annualized inﬂation rate is 103 percent. The question we ask here is whether, over
the cycle, the central bank has incentives to use inﬂation rates that are quantitatively diﬀerent
from their long-run optimal value. There are in principle two reasons why the answer could be
positive. The ﬁrst one is that the steady-state wedge due to the misalignment of beneﬁto fv a r i e t y
and markup is not fully closed by the choice of the optimal long-run inﬂation rate: therefore, the
central bank may use positive short-run inﬂation to bring markups even closer to the beneﬁto f
variety–very much like under C.E.S. preferences when  −1 The second reason why the central
bank may use inﬂation over the cycle is that the ﬂexible-price equilibrium is ineﬃcient not only
in levels, but also over time, because the ﬂexible-price markup is endogenously time-varying (just
as under the exponential preferences covered above). By the same mechanism as for exponential
preferences, optimal policy implies short-run deﬂation in order to smooth the path of markups and
hence minimize the dynamic entry distortion.
The net eﬀect on short-run inﬂation of these two forces (alleviating the static and dynamic entry
distortions) results in short-run deﬂation for standard calibrations. Figure 7 plots impulse responses
of macroeconomic variables under the Ramsey-optimal policy for a rather extreme parameterization
of  =0 1 implying a high elasticity of desired markups to number of producers, and hence a strong
dynamic entry distortion–therefore, these results can be viewed as an upper bound on the degree of
deviations from short-run price stability. As before, we also plot the benchmark responses obtained
in the ﬂexible-price equilibrium in order to gauge the quantitative signiﬁcance of deviations from
short-run price stability under optimal policy. As the ﬁgure shows, the deviations from steady-state
inﬂation implied by optimal policy are again insigniﬁcant. The maximum value of the deﬂation rate
is a mere 0015 basis points, translating into a 022 percent fall in the price level over 25 quarters.
The responses of consumption, number of ﬁrms, and hours worked are almost identical to their
ﬂexible-price counterparts. Therefore, we conclude that short-run price stability (around a non-
33zero long-run trend) is close to optimal when distortions in the form of both ineﬃcient ﬂuctuations
in ﬂexible-price markups and misalignement of markup and beneﬁt of variety are present. This
result is robust to considering diﬀerent elasticities of the desired markup to the number of ﬁrms (a
lower elasticity implies that the dynamic distortion is smaller and therefore reduces even further
the scope for inﬂation variations) and diﬀerent values for the other parameters; the results of these
robustness exercises are available upon request.
Figure 7: Impulse responses to a productivity shock for translog preferences with  =0 1 under
Ramsey policy (red, crossed line) and ﬂexible prices (blue line). Inﬂation and interest rate are in
basis points deviations, the rest in percentage deviations from steady state.
346 The Welfare Cost of Price Stability
The analysis above suggests that undoing the sticky-price distortion is suboptimal in the long-run
equilibrium of an economy with product creation driven by a preference for variety and monopoly
proﬁts when the beneﬁt of variety to consumers is not aligned with the market incentive for entry
(the net markup). However, price stability (around a non-zero trend) is close to optimal in the
short run.O u r ﬁnal exercise assesses quantitatively the welfare cost of price stability. To that
end, we compute two welfare losses: a static and a dynamic one.23 The static welfare loss is
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between lifetime welfare under a policy that fully stabilizes PPI inﬂation
around its Ramsey-optimal value and the “alternative” policy whereby the monetary authority
stabilizes PPI inﬂation at zero in the short and the long run; The purpose of this exercise is to
isolate the role of what we earlier called the static entry distortion.T h e dynamic welfare loss is
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between lifetime welfare under Ramsey-optimal policy and the “alternative”
policy whereby the monetary authority stabilizes PPI inﬂation around its Ramsey-optimal long-run
value; this exercise isolates the role of the dynamic entry distortion. All computations assume that
productivity shocks have a persistence of 095 and a standard deviation of 0007 values that are
standard in the business cycle literature (details of our computations are available upon request).
23Both losses are deﬁned, in the Lucas (1987) tradition, as the units of steady-state consumption that we would
need to give the household in order to make it indiﬀerent (in terms of expected present discounted utility) between a
certain policy and a benchmark equilibrium (which may be the Ramsey-optimal equilibrium); see also Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2007) for similar welfare calculations in a diﬀerent model.
35Figure 8: Static and dynamic welfare losses in percentage points of steady-state consumption,
general C.E.S. preferences.
Figure 8 plots the static and dynamic welfare losses for general C.E.S. preferences, as a function
of the beneﬁt of variety parameter. The upper panel shows that the welfare cost of pursuing long-
run price stability can be very high, depending on the beneﬁt of variety. The loss is U-shaped and
attains a minimum value of zero when preferences are of the C.E.S.-D.S. form, consistent with our
result that price stability is optimal in that case. Otherwise, the loss ranges from 064 percent
of steady-state consumption (when the beneﬁt of variety is negligible) to almost 2 percent when
the beneﬁto fv a r i e t yi s =1  Importantly, however, the dynamic welfare loss (plotted in the
lower panel) shows that once the central bank stabilizes prices at the Ramsey-optimal target in
all periods, the loss is virtually zero: Its maximum value is merely 0003 percent of steady-state
consumption for the maximum value of  that we consider.
36Figure 9: Dynamic welfare loss for exponential preferences, and static and dynamic welfare losses
for translog preferences, all in percentage points of steady-state consumption.
Figure 9 plots the dynamic welfare loss for exponential preferences, and the static and dynamic
welfare losses under translog (the static loss under exponential–not plotted–is zero because the
static entry distortion does not operate). For exponential preferences, the dynamic loss plotted in
the top panel is negligible: Even for values of  close to zero (implying that the dynamic entry
distortion is “large”) the loss from fully stabilizing prices around the Ramsey-optimal long-run
trend is almost zero (000009 percentage points at most). The middle panel plots the static loss
under translog, as a function of  The loss is sizable (around 03 percent) for very low values of
37 because in that case the static entry distortion is high (recall that the static entry distortion
under translog is measured by half the markup–the diﬀerence between net markup and beneﬁto f
variety–and the markup is a decreasing function of , for given ). The lower panel shows that
the dynamic entry distortion is nevertheless negligible: Even at values of  close to zero, implying
a very large distortion, the dynamic loss merely attains 00002 percentage points.
Our results, pointing to negligible dynamic welfare losses for all types of preferences considered,
reinforce our previous ﬁnding that dynamic responses to productivity shocks are very close under
Ramsey-optimal policy and ﬂexible prices. We conclude that the loss from fully stabilizing PPI
inﬂation is negligible once the long-run inﬂation target has been optimally chosen taking into
account the nature of preferences and market incentives for entry.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
A large literature studies optimal monetary policy in the presence of imperfect price adjustment
and other real or monetary distortions. A general conclusion of this literature is that the optimal
long-run rate of inﬂation is zero or very close to zero. Moreover, in an environment in which
productivity shocks are the only source of uncertainty, perfectly stabilizing prices over the business
cycle (and hence replicating the ﬂexible-price allocation) is optimal, or nearly so. This paper argues
that the optimal long-run rate of inﬂation can be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in an environment
with endogenous entry and product variety, but price stability (around this long-run trend) is close
to optimal over the cycle. The sign and magnitude of the optimal long-run inﬂation rate depend on
the balance between the market incentives for entry (measured by the steady-state markup) and
the welfare beneﬁt of product variety to consumers. When the market outcome results in too much
entry relative to what the consumer values (when the markup is higher than the beneﬁto fv a r i e t y ) ,
positive long-run inﬂation is optimal because it erodes long-run markups and proﬁt margins, and it
reduces entry. In the opposite case, long-run deﬂation is optimal, because it increases steady-state
markups and hence provides more incentives for entry. The long-run rate of inﬂation is zero only
in the knife-edge case of C.E.S.-D.S. preferences, for which the net markup is equal to the beneﬁt
of variety. Finally, the welfare loss resulting from not recognizing the non-zero long-run target for
inﬂation can be sizable, depending on the beneﬁt of variety parameter; In contrast, the welfare loss
due to stabilizing prices in the short run is negligible, once the long-run inﬂation target has been
chosen optimally.
Our analysis provides a hitherto unexplored argument for potentially signiﬁcant deviations from
38long-run price stability, with deviations of potential magnitudes not encountered in other economic
environments no matter the type of underlying distortions (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2011, for
an exhaustive review of the robustness of the “zero optimal inﬂation” policy prescription). Since
the single most important determinant of optimal long-run inﬂation is the balance of markups and
beneﬁto fv a r i e t y ,o u rﬁndings point to the need for continued study of the determinants of markups
and serious empirical investigation of the nature of preferences for variety.
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43Appendix
A Ramsey-Optimal Policy and Variety
The four ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to labor, inﬂation, labor in the consumption sector,
and the number of product varieties next period, obtained by solving the Ramsey problem (5) are,
respectively:
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+  (1 − )3




where we used () ≡
0()
()  in the last equation.
A-1The non-stochastic steady state is such that:




















() ()+[ 1− ()]
































[1 −  ()]
−(1 − ) (1 − )
2(1 + )

+  (1 − )3






















[1 −  (1 − )] () −  (1 − )
1 −  ()

=0 
where the ﬁrst four equations are the steady-state versions of the ﬁrst-order conditions outlined
above, and the last three correspond to the constraints of the Ramsey problem in Table 3.
When is a steady state with zero inﬂation  =0a solution to the Ramsey problem? To answer
this question, conjecture that  =0in steady state. The ﬁrst-order condition for the choice of
inﬂation (the second equation above) then implies that the Lagrange multiplier on the Phillips
curve is zero:
2 =0 
Naturally, the constraint associated to imperfect price adjustment is not binding in steady state
when there is zero inﬂation. The other conditions evaluated at this equilibrium imply (we use the







[ +[ () − 1]( + )] = 0

























The second and third equations imply:
1+( 1− )1 − ()[() − 1] − [() − 1]( + )1 =0  (11)
But the fourth and sixth equations imply:
[() − 1]( + ) =( 1− )





This proves the result.
BP r i c e I n d e x a t i o n
In this Appendix, we outline some of the implications of price indexation for Ramsey-optimal
monetary policy. We assume that rather than paying the adjustment cost when deviating from


















24A simple indexation scheme whereby ﬁr m si n d e xt oac o n s t a n ti n ﬂation rate ˜  rather than past inﬂation, would
merely imply that the optimal long-run inﬂation rate is uniformly increased by the constant ˜  without aﬀecting any
of the other results.
A-3where  ∈ [01] is the indexation parameter. Under this indexation scheme, it can be easily

















i − 1 (13)
Note that this nests the no-indexation case when  =0and the full-indexation case when  =1 
Under full indexation, however, the steady-state inﬂation rate will be indeterminate: There is no
long-run cost of using inﬂation ((12) evaluated at the steady-state implies  =0 ) and no beneﬁt
of inﬂation (the long-run Phillips curve (13) is vertical  = ( − 1)). For values of  in the open
interval (01) our long-run results change as follows. The optimal rate of inﬂation (deﬂation) is
increasing (in absolute value) with the indexation parameter . When indexation is almost full (
is close to 1) the optimal rate of long-run inﬂation (deﬂation) is indeed very large.
The reasons why indexation implies larger deviations from long-run price stability are twofold:
First, indexation lowers the welfare cost associated with a given long-run inﬂation rate (the steady-






  is decreasing in ). Second, indexation
causes the long-run Phillips curve to steepen, and hence requires larger inﬂation rates to achieve
a certain change in long-run markup. Figure B.1 illustrates this mechanism, plotting the LRPC
for a positive indexation parameter (in dashed-dot line) along with the LRPC for no indexation
previously plotted in Figure 1 (solid line). The ﬁgure illustrates that in order to achieve a certain
movement in long-run markup, necessary in order to bring it closer to the beneﬁto fv a r i e t y ,a
higher value of long-run inﬂation (or deﬂation) needs to be chosen by the central bank.
A-4Figure B.1: The Long-run Phillips curve with and without indexation (dashed and solid curve,
respectively).
Figure B.2 illustrates these results quantitatively, plotting the optimal long-run rate of inﬂation
for C.E.S. preferences as a function of the indexation parameter , for the two extreme value of the
beneﬁto fv a r i e t y : =0and  =1  respectively.25 For empirically plausible degrees of indexation
(estimated for instance by Smets and Wouters, 2007, in the range between 025 and 05), optimal
long-run inﬂation rates range from around 6 percent inﬂation (for  =0 ) to around 10 percent
deﬂation (for  =1 ). A similar picture occurs under translog preferences (not plotted), where the
optimal long-run rate of inﬂation, given  =0 353,r a n g e sf r o m103 percent under no indexation
to approximately 10 percent when  =0 9 (results are available upon request).
25The domain of  is restricted to values lower than 09 because, for larger values, the optimal rate of long-run
inﬂation (deﬂation) becomes extremely large (close to 600 percent inﬂation and 300 percent deﬂation, respectively,
for  =0 99).
A-5Figure B.2: The optimal long-run inﬂation rate as a function of the indexation parameter 
Figure B.3 illustrates the implications of price indexation for short-run optimal policy, by plot-
ting the impulse responses to a productivity shock under C.E.S. preferences with no beneﬁtf r o m
variety ( =0 ) for two extreme values of the indexation parameter  (0 and 09). Indexation, by
the same logic that applied to the long run, implies higher optimal variation in short-run inﬂation
rates and the price level. But the implied movements are still quantitatively small: The maximum
value of inﬂation is 025 basis points (attained after 10 quarters), translating into an increase in
the price level of 37 percent. Most importantly, the paths of real variables (consumption, hours,
and number of ﬁrms) are invariant to the indexation parameter: Indexation makes inﬂation less
costly, but it also makes the Phillips curve more vertical, meaning that a larger inﬂation rate has
as m a l l e re ﬀect on real variables.26 We therefore conclude that indexation aﬀects signiﬁcantly the
optimal monetary policy prescriptions in the long run, but not in the short run.
26A similar result occurs under translog preferences: Responses of real variables are invariant to the degree of index-
ation, and optimal deﬂation under indexation attains a maximum of 006 basis points after 10 quarters, translating
into a fall in the price level of around 1 percent; results are available upon request.
A-6Figure B.3: Impulse responses to a productivity shock for C.E.S. preferences with  =0under
Ramsey policy, under no indexation  =0(blue line) and indexation  =0 9 (red, crossed line).
Inﬂation and interest rate are in basis points deviations, the rest in percentage deviations from
steady state.
A-7